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Abstract
This paper firstly analyzes the effects of China’s and the 
U.S. subsidy policies through comparing the developing 
strategies, specific subsidies and industrial conditions. 
Then by establishing two three-stage sequential game 
models, the inherent defects of China’s subsidy are 
studied. Finally the advantages of the U.S. industrial 
and trade policy portfolio are analyzed to give policy 
enlightenment. The result shows: China’s export 
oriented production subsidies could not maximize social 
welfare in the short term. It was not conductive to the 
development of core industrial competitiveness because 
of the extrusion effect of R&D. What’s more, it tended 
to provoke quick and excess production capacity which 
led to a large number of low-priced exports, causing 
trade conflicts and loss of oversea markets. While the 
U.S. combined regulatory compliant subsidy and trade 
remedy. Market subsidy increased the demand and helped 
industry to expand production scale and lower the cost. 
R&D subsidy encouraged R&D investment and improved 
industrial competitiveness. Trade remedy was used to 
prevent foreign low-priced import shocks and guarantee 
the effectiveness of the two subsidies. To sum up, China 
shall change the export-oriented development strategy, 
develop core competitiveness on technology, eliminate 
unreasonable subsidies, make good use of market subsidy, 
R&D subsidy and trade remedy measures.
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. trade investigations targeted at developing 
countries are gradually shifting from traditional industries 
to strategic emerging industries. With China’s industrial 
upgrading process, the trade between U.S. and China is 
transforming from complementarity to competitive. Thus, 
the U.S.-China trade conflict is more than an international 
trade problem, but having influencing on international 
industry competition and policy formulation. In these 
circumstances, the traditional subsidy policies, which used 
to expand exports and prompt industrial development, 
fail to follow the new situations of international trade and 
industrial competition. 
The U.S. and China have made plans and policies to 
promote their photovoltaic industries, in order to lead the 
renewable energy industries and occupy the economic 
commanding heights in post-petroleum era. China’s State 
Council’s Decision on Speeding up the Cultivating and 
Developing Strategic Emerging Industry and People’s 
Republic of China’s Twelfth Five Year Plan for National 
Economic and Social Development Program, promulgated 
in 2010 and 2011 respectively, included photovoltaic 
industry as China’s one of strategic emerging industries. 
In 2012, President Barack Obama promulgated U.S. 
Blueprint for Manufacturing Revitalization, also called 
photovoltaic industry as its one of key supported industries 
to back industry upgrading and energy security. However, 
the U.S. had clear developing ideas, which referred to 
a combination of industrial subsidy and trade remedy 
measures. While China conducted export-oriented policies 
involving mainly production subsidy, which gave rise to 
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excess production. Therefore, the detailed comparison and 
analysis will offer reference to the Chinese government to 
make proper subsidy policies for the strategic emerging 
industries in the future.
1.  LITERATURE REVIEW
Currently, there are three general directions in the 
research of government subsidy. First, the research on 
the subsidy instruments, especially fiscal appropriation, 
finance discount and tax returns. For example, Capron 
and Van Pottelsberghe investigated on the relationship 
of government’s R&D appropriation subsidy and 
companies’ R&D investment (Capron & Van, 1997). 
Mohnen investigated on the effects of tax returns 
(Mohnen, 1997) and Joost Heijis investigated on the 
effects of Spain government’s loan to the corporations’ 
R&D with discounted interest (Joost, 2005). The second 
kind is the research on subsidy periods, especially the 
comparison of prior subsidy and post one. According to 
Huang, Xie and Chen, Xie’s investigation, post subsidy’ 
welfare effect is superior for it can suppress rent-seeking 
and resource conservation (Huang & Xie, 2007; Chen & 
Xie, 2009). The third kind is on the objects of subsidy. 
Kesavayuth and Vasileios compared the welfare effects of 
the duopolistic R&D subsidy and the production subsidy 
and concluded that technology spillovers level has great 
influence on the strengths and weaknesses of these two 
subsidies (Kesavayuth & Vasileios, 2012). Based on 
Hetelling model, Xiao and Wang conducted dynamic 
game analysis on the R&D subsidy and the production 
subsidy, respectively (Xiao & Wang, 2013). Zhou, Sheng 
and Chen applied empirical analysis to prove that the 
subsidies of R&D and production process have incentive 
function on export and potential mismatch effects on 
resources (Zhou, Sheng & Chen, 2014). 
In a word, previous research on governments’ 
subsidy was usually target at a particular aspect of 
subsidy based on theoretical or empirical analysis, but 
rarely specifically modeled a practical case to make 
comprehensive judgment. In this paper, specific models 
are set according to U.S.-China’s trade conflicts on 
photovoltaic industry and their trade policies, showing 
the disadvantage of China’s production subsidy and how 
to combine proper industry subsidy with trade remedy 
measures to develop strategic industry. 
2 .   COMPARISON BETWEEN THE 
U.S. ’S AND CHINA’S INDUSTRIAL 
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES
2.1  The Industrial Development Strategies and 
Subsidy Policies 
China and the U.S. shared the same strategic objective to 
boost their individual photovoltaic industry competitiveness 
in the international market. But the specific strategies were 
quite different. 
The U.S. was cradleland of photovoltaic technology. On 
one hand, it put emphasis on technical innovation to increase 
electricity generation efficiency for cost reduction and lead 
technological development direction in industry. On the 
other hand, domestic market cultivation was adopted to form 
scale effects for the manufacturers to reduce cost and be 
competitive worldwide. As for China, photovoltaic industry 
was treated as an export-oriented industry, meeting strong 
market demand of Europe, the U.S. and Japan from 2001 on. 
Accordingly, lower value-added and technology demanding 
part of industry chain, namely photovoltaic battery 
manufacturing, obtained intensive capital investment 
to enhance scale effects, reduce cost and expand 
competitiveness. While domestic market cultivation and 
technological innovations were paid little attention. 
With different development strategies, China and 
the U.S. promulgated totally different industrial subsidy 
policies. The U.S. had supportive policies in R&D, 
production investment and market consuming, among 
which the subsidies on R&D are of the largest amount. 
In 2012, 8 billion dollars among the financial budget 
were used in renewable energy R&D. The market 
consuming subsidies were at the second place, including 
consuming tax deduction, initial-installation subsidy, 
online electricity price and renewable energy quota 
system. At last, the government offered some production 
subsidies to qualified corporations as the auxiliary 
subsidies, like tax deduction, loan guarantee and cash 
subsidies. In contrast, China lacked support for R&D, 
on one hand; on the other, China had conducted market 
application subsidies on a few particular demonstration-
scale projects, ignoring market subsidies covering civil 
and commercial photovoltaic product consuming. China’s 
financial subsidies were mainly focusd on the corporation 
investment and exportation. In addition, the central 
government failed to carry out clear unified subsidy plans 
and the local governments’ subsidy policies were twisted 
and chaotic, including offering cheap land and electricity 
supply, low-interest loan and income tax allowance, 
export tax rebate, which are actionable or even prohibited 
subsidies in WTO provisions1. 
The Table 1 was the main relevant subsidies of China 
raised against by U.S. countervailing measures. From the 
table, the Chinese governments’ subsidies included a large 
amount of actionable or even prohibited subsidies aiming 
to promote production and export, such as preferential 
loan, provision of goods and services for LTAR, 
preferential tax provision, specified government grants 
and export incentives. 
1 WTO Agreement of Subsidy and Anti-subsidy (SCM) divides 
the subsidies into three categories: prohibited subsidies, actionable 
subsidies and non-actionable subsidies, and gives the specific 
definitions and scales of them.
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Table 1
Main Related Subsidies in the U.S. Countervailing Investigation Towards China’s Photovoltaic Product
Categories Items
Prohibitive subsidy
(1) Export Tax Refund for Exporting FIEs 
(2) Grants for Export, such as research fund for export products, overseas-developing industry funds
(3) Export Credit Subsidy Programs: Export Buyer’s Credits
Actionable subsidy
(1) Golden Sun Demonstration Program, involved firms get grants
(2) Preferential Policy Lending
(3) Provision of Polysilicon, Land and Electricity for LTAR (Less Adequate Remuneration) Programs
(4) Preferential Tax Program for High or New Technology Enterprises (HNTEs)
(5) “Two Free, Three Half” Program for Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIEs)
(6) Import Tariff and Value Added Tax (VAT) Exemptions for Use of Imported Equipment
(7) VAT Rebates on FIE Purchases of Chinese-made Equipment
(8) Policy-based Low Interest Loan
Non-actionable subsidy (1) Enterprise Income Tax Law, Research and Development Program
Note. Adapted from Untied States Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration Memorandum, C-570-980 Investigation 
1/1/10-12/31/10.
2.2  Effects of Subsidy on Photovoltaic Industries 
in China and the U.S. 
The two countries’ disparate policies led to industrial 
dilemma in China and trade conflicts between U.S.-
China. In China, a large amount of production and 
export-related subsidies had taken effects in promoting 
industry competitiveness by purely expanding scale 
effects to increase rapidly the production output and 
export. As Figure 1 shows, started from 2004, the total 
exports and the U.S. market share of Chinese production 
grow rapidly. However, export and production oriented 
subsidies had significant defects. First, the excessive 
horizontal expansion at processing part of industry chain 
of production scale and industrial homogeneity in many 
regions nationwide led to a huge overcapacity and the low-
price competition in the market. Second, low investment 
in R&D caused lacked of core technology so that 
equipment and key materials depended importing from 
abroad. Third, domestic market failed to be cultivated 
and more than 90% of the products were exported. As a 
result, exportation surged, low-price competition and non-
rational governmental subsidy, multiplied the risk of being 
imposed on trade remedy measures by trade partners. 
Figure 1 also shows the expansion of photovoltaic cell 
production, insufficient domestic demand and excess 
production capability in China. 
Figure 1 
Market Demands and Supplies of Photovoltaic Batteries in China and in the world (Unit: GW)
Note. Adapted from Chinese Photovoltaic Industry Research Report for 2012, Chinese Solar Cell Industry Analyst Report for 2010 by The 
National Development and Reform Commission, P.R.C, North Star Energy Website. 
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U.S. government’s R&D subsidies and market 
subsidies had greatly facilitated the domestic photovoltaic 
industry. Benefited from R&D subsidy policies, the U.S. 
invented the revolutionary “thin film” photovoltaic cells 
technology and kept the record of photo-electro transition 
rate (the crucial index) of photovoltaic batteries, which 
indicated the leading role of the photovoltaic technology 
worldwide. On the aspect of market application, U.S. 
consuming subsidy lowered the comparatively high 
generating cost of photovoltaic and expanded domestic 
market demands, which laid the domestic market 
foundation for its photovoltaic industry. But as shown in 
Table 2, from 2004, China’s exporters rapidly occupied 
the international market with low cost and price. U.S. 
R&D subsidy could not help its corporation to obtain 
advantage over China’s cheap product through new 
technology and enough quality gap (as shown in Table 
3, photovoltaic products in U.S. market imported from 
China obtained higher and higher comparative advantage). 
Obviously, the producer surplus and market benefits 
cultivated by consuming subsidy had also been grasped by 
China’s enterprises. 
Table 2 
Export of Photovoltaic Batteries for China and the U.S.
Year Export sales for U.S.(U.S. Dollar)
Export sales for China
(U.S. Dollar)
Export sales ratio (U.S./
China %)
Market share of Chinese photovoltaic 
products in the U.S. (%)
2004 1,393,875,246 644,213,418 2.164 10.8
2005 1,626,971,179 1,257,539,068 1.294 12.3
2006 1,624,482,628 2,459,654,426 0.660 14.5
2007 1,913,977,039 5,252,290,979 0.364 18.4
2008 2,364,209,170 11,745,396,579 0.201 17.2
2009 2,417,122,647 10,721,202,006 0.225 25.0
2010 3,250,274,739 25,178,622,946 0.129 36.1
2011 2,961,786,505 27,946,187,160 0.106 47.5
2012 2,380,096,767 17,483,232,531 0.136 31.8
Note. Adapted from UN Comtrade (the world’s trade database, http://comtrade.un.org/), (HS coding: 854140, photovoltaic and semiconductor 
equipment).
The U.S. distinguished the photovoltaic industry as one 
of the strategic industries to raise national competitiveness 
and maintain sustainable development. Thus, when its 
domestic products were threatened by the export-oriented 
Chinese products, the U.S. adopted the trade remedy 
measures to eliminate the international shock of the 
products and to coordinate the subsidy policies. 
Table 3
The Index Value of the Revealed Comparative Advantage 
for Chinese Photovoltaic Batteries in U.S. Market2
Year RCA CR
2004 0.78
2005 0.82 1.05
2006 0.92 1.11
2007 1.09 1.19
2008 1.04 0.96
2009 1.30 1.24
2010 1.85 1.43
2011 2.57 1.39
2012 1.67 0.65
Note. Adapted from UN Comtrade (the world’s trade database, 
http://comtrade.un.org/).
2 The revealed comparative advantage index was introduced 
by Bella, Lhasa, an American economist in 1965, which is the 
measurement index of the market competitive capability of one’s 
export products and is formulated by RCA = (Xi/Xt)/(Wi/Wt), where 
Xi is the export volume of one’s specific industry, Xt is one’s total 
export volume, Wi is the export volume of the specific industry in the 
world, Wt is the total export volume in the world. The larger RCA 
value is, the better its market competitive capability is. The dynamic 
comparative advantage index is CR = RCAt/RCAt-1, which represents 
the variation of the comparative advantage: if CR>1, the comparative 
advantage increases; if CR<1 the comparative advantage decreases.
3.  DEFECTS OF CHINA’S EXPORT-
ORIENTED PRODUCTION SUBSIDIES
China’s strategy is to simply expand production capacity 
and earn profits by exporting. Without a rational plan, 
Chinese photovoltaic industry obtained competitiveness 
and occupied international markets in short terms by great 
quantity of investment and production subsidies to expand 
scale and lower marginal cost. However, this development 
strategy had turned out to have defects. First, Chinese 
photovoltaic industry was large but not strong in the 
case of excess production and lack of core technology; 
second, the huge amount of subsidy failed to benefit 
domestic customers, to boost the industrial development 
to be free of government support which caused the fact 
that the tremendous continuous subsidy would spend 
large financial resources but failed to improve the social 
welfare; third, great export expansion benefited from 
actionable and prohibited subsidy in SCM in short terms 
was easy to cause trade conflicts, and exporters would 
lost the whole export market due to high tariff once were 
imposed on trade remedy measures. In the following 
part, perfect information three-stage game models will be 
established to analyze this phenomenon. 
First, we establish the Cournot competition game 
model on the two domestic companies to explain why 
export-oriented production subsidy caused industry 
large but not strong, lack of core technologies, import-
dependence of core production facility and raw material 
and export-dependence of sales market. Assumed with 
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complete information, the two companies produce same-
quality products and their output is qi and qj, respectively, 
with the same price p = a - qi - qj. One of the companies 
is engaged in R&D in order to reduce cost. The Return 
to Scale (RS) of the R&D investment xj remains the 
same and there is R&D spillovers effect with coefficient 
θ(0≤θ≤1) to the other company. The government only 
offers the fixed rate subsidy Su(0≤Su≤1) to the production 
process. The initial cost for unit product is α, but the 
marginal cost decreases because of government subsidy 
and enterprise R&D investment. The enterprise interest 
function is the difference of the producer’s profit and 
R&D cost; the government target function, namely the 
total social benefit, equals the consumer’s surplus plus 
producer’s profit and then minus subsidy. In the first 
stage, the government determines the optimum subsidy 
rate by maximizing the total social welfare. In the second 
stage, the company which intends to do the R&D makes 
its optimum R&D investment policy in order to maximize 
its interest. In the third stage, the two companies 
determine their optimum production outputs in order to 
maximize their own interest. For the dynamic game theory 
model with complete information, we apply the backward 
induction to achieve the subgame Nash equilibrium. The 
detailed process is as following:
In the third stage, when the two companies determine 
their optimal production output, we take the derivatives of 
their interest functions with respect to qi and qj. 
The company i does not conduct R&D so its interest 
function is: 
	 	 πi = {a - qi - qj - [α(1 - Su) - θxj]}qi (1)
The company j conducts R&D so its interest function 
is: 
	 πj = {a - qi - qj - [α(1 - Su) - xj]}qj	-	ηjxj (2)
Solving 
书
πi /qi=0 (3) 
书
πj /qj=0(4) we get:
 qi = 1/3[a + (2θ	-	1)xj - (1 - Su)a] (5)
 qj = 1/3[a + (2 - θ)xj - (1 - Su)α] (6)
By substituting (5) and (6) into (1) and (2) to eliminate 
qi and qj, we get their interest functionπ1i and π1j with their 
own optimal production output. Back to the second stage, 
by taking π1i‘s derivative with respect to xj and setting the 
derivative result to be 0, we get xj, which is the optimal 
R&D investment of the company engaged in R&D.
Solving 
书
π1j /
书
πj=0 (7) we get:
 
2
4 4 4 9 2 2 2
2( 2 )
j
j
a Su a Su
x
α α η θ αθ αθ
θ
− + − + + − +
=
− +
 (8)
By substituting it to the equations π1i and π1j, 
respectively, to eliminate xj, we get the two interest 
functions π1i and π1j of the two companies which have 
taken the optimal output policies. 
Back to the first stage, the government determines 
the production subsidy in order to maximize its target 
function output. A benevolent government pursues the 
maximum social total welfare. Its target function is: 
  W(Su) = CS + π	-	SU	 (9)
where the consumers’ welfare refers to:
  CS = (qi + qj)2/2 (10)
the companies’ total interest is:
   π	=	π2i	+	π2j (11)
And the subsidy function is:
	 	 SU = Su·α·(qi + qj) (12)
By substituting (10), (11) and (12) to the equation (9), 
we get the government’s target function with respect to 
the subsidy rate Su.
By solving 
书
W /
书
Su = 0 (13) we get:
    
2
( 1 2 )[ 2 ( 2 )( 1 ) 2 ( 2 )( 1 ) 5 ]
2 ( 2 )( 1 )
j jSu
θ η α θ θ α θ θ η θ
α θ θ
− + − − + − + + − + − + −
=
− + − +
 
2
(50 40( 2 )( 1 ) 250 )( 1 2 )
2 ( 2 )( 1 )
Su θ θ θ θ
α θ θ
− − + − + − − +
=
− + − +
 (14)
By substituting the balanced subsidy rate Su into 
the enterprise interest functions, the enterprise R&D 
investment, the enterprise production output and the 
government target function, it’s able to get the key 
variables’ balanced values in the case of the optimal 
subsidy policy. In this paper, the influence of the 
subsidy to the enterprise R&D investment and the 
market structure are primarily investigated. First, we set 
rational assumption of the parameter values, namely the 
market demand, cost and the enterprise R&D efficiency: 
a = 30 a = 10 ηi = 30. Substituted them into (14), we get:
 
2
( 1 2 )[ 2 ( 2 )( 1 ) 2 ( 2 )( 1 ) 5 ]
2 ( 2 )( 1 )
j jSu
θ η α θ θ α θ θ η θ
α θ θ
− + − − + − + + − + − + −
=
− + − +
 
2
(50 40( 2 )( 1 ) 250 )( 1 2 )
2 ( 2 )( 1 )
Su θ θ θ θ
α θ θ
− − + − + − − +
=
− + − +
 (15)
If 0≤Su≤1, then 0≤θ≤0.5. So Assume the government 
is able to properly adjust the technology spillover by 
measures like intellectual property right regulations and 
market supervision, then government can rationally adjust 
technology spillover rate and subsidy rate to maximize the 
total social welfare. 
If θ	=	0.3, so that the government is able to obtain 
the optimal economic state by adjusting the industrial 
technology spillover to an appropriate state and applying 
the optimal subsidy rate. Therefore, the relationship 
between the optimal subsidy rate and the enterprise R&D 
investment is as follow:
  xj = 0.173(382-34Su) (16)
So when the government is conducting the balanced 
production subsidy, we can make conclusions accordingly. 
First, from Eq. (16), the enterprise R&D investment is 
influenced by the crowing-out effect of the production 
subsidy. That is to say, the larger the subsidy rate, the less 
the motivation of the enterprise R&D investment. Second, 
from Eq. (5) and (6), the optimal production output of 
company taking R&D measures is proportional to its R&D 
investment, while that of the company which doesn’t take 
R&D has the inverse ratio relationship with the R&D 
investment (notice that 0≤θ≤0.5). Third, the higher the 
production subsidy rate, the lower the optimal production 
output that the company taking R&D will get, while the 
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higher the optimal production output that the company don’t 
taking R&D will get. Therefore, though the government’s 
production subsidy does good to both two companies 
by covering part of their marginal production cost, pure 
production subsidy suppresses the development of company 
engaged in R&D. Because on the one hand, it will restrain 
company’s R&D investment and lower its optimal output; 
on the other, it will increase the optimal output of company 
not engaged in R&D. So, pure production subsidy tends 
to encourage companies to put investment on expanding 
production capacity instead of R&D. 
Furthermore, we establish a Cournot competition game 
model based on two countries’ competitive industries 
in order to explain that the export-oriented production 
subsidy for the Chinese government fails to streamline 
total social welfare, but cause wasting of financial 
resources. 
Assume the information is complete, the two 
countries’ industries produce same-quality products and 
their outputs are qi and qj, respectively, with the same 
price p = a - qi - qj. The American industry takes cost-
reducing R&D and the returns to scale (RS) of the R&D 
investment is constant. On the contrary, the Chinese 
industry doesn’t take R&D. China has no chance to get 
the benefits of the technology spillover effect since the 
American industry is equipped with the strict regulation 
to protect their intellectual property rights, and it 
don’t make foreign direct investment to China. All the 
Chinese products is targeted to exported to the American 
market, in competition with the American products. 
Chinese government offers fixed rate production subsidy 
Sui0≤Su≤1 while the American government offers fixed 
rate subsidy Suj to the R&D activities. The initial cost for 
unit product is α, but the real cost becomes less because 
of government subsidy and enterprise R&D investment. 
The enterprise interest function is the difference of the 
producer’s profit (sales income minus sales cost) and 
R&D cost. The government target function, namely 
the total social welfare, equals the consumer’s surplus 
plus producer’s profit minus subsidy. In the first stage, 
the two governments determine the optimal production 
subsidy rate and R&D subsidy rate to maximize their 
own total social benefits, respectively; in the second 
stage, the American industry makes its optimal R&D 
investment policy in order to maximize its interest. In the 
third stage, the two countries’ industries determine their 
optimal production outputs in order to maximize their 
own interest. For the dynamic game theory model with 
complete information, we apply the backward induction 
to achieve the subgame Nash equilibrium. The detailed 
process is as following.
The interest functions of the two countries’ industries:
	 	 	 πi = {a - qi - qj -	α(1 - Su)}qj (17)
	 πj = [a - qi - qj - (α - xj)]qj	-	ηjxj(1 - Su) (18)
In the third stage, when the two countries’ industries 
determine their optimal production output, we take the 
derivatives of their interest functions with respect to qi and 
qj, respectively. 
   
书
πi /qi=0 (19)
   
书
πj /qj=0 (20)
Then we get:
  qi = 1/3(a	-	α - xj + 2Suiα) (21)
  qj = 1/3(a	-	α + 2xj - Suiα) (22)
By substituting (21) and (22) into (17) and (18) to 
eliminate qi and qj, we get their interest function πi and 
πj with their own optimal production output. Back to the 
second stage, by taking πi ‘s derivative with respect to xj 
and setting the derivative result to be 0, we get xj, which 
is the optimal R&D investment of American industry in 
order to maximize its interest.
By solving 
 1 0j
jx
π∂
=
∂
 1[ 4 4 9 (4 9 ) ]
8j j j j
x a Suα η α η= − + + + −
 (23) we get:
  
 1 0j
jx
π∂
=
∂
 1[ 4 4 9 (4 9 ) ]
8j j j j
x a Suα η α η= − + + + −  (24)
By substituting it to the equations π1i and π1j, 
respectively, to eliminate xj, we get the two interest 
functions π2i and π2j of the two countries’ industries which 
have taken the optimal output policies. 
Back to the first stage, the two governments game to 
maximize their own government target function, namely 
their own social total welfare: 
    Wi(Sui, Suj) = π2i - Sui·α·qi (25)
  Wj(Sui, Suj) = (qi + qj)
2/2 + π2i - Sui·η·xj (26)
The two governments determine their own optimal 
subsidy rate, respectively. By solving  0i
i
W
Su
∂
=
∂
 
0j
j
W
Su
∂
=
∂
 1 4 ( )
9 27j
Su a α= + −
(27) and  0i
i
W
Su
∂
=
∂
 
0j
j
W
Su
∂
=
∂
 1 4 ( )
9 27j
Su a α= + −
(28), we get the two balanced subsidy rates: 
   Sui = 0 (29)
    
 0i
i
W
Su
∂
=
∂
 
0j
j
W
Su
∂
=
∂
 1 4 ( )
9 27j
Su a α= + −  (30)
From the modelling results, for China, its optimal 
subsidy rate is 0 in order to maximize its social total 
welfare if only the export-led production subsidy is 
offered. In other words, China should not supply the 
production subsidy. Otherwise, the production subsidy 
from Chinese government will benefit the American 
customers through the cheap products. Because the 
production subsidy has led to output expansion, the 
increase of the industrial revenue is unable to cover 
the subsidy cost. Thus, although Chinese government’s 
production subsidy policy has expanded the industry and 
export scale, China is unable to achieve the maximum 
social welfare in the short-term game equilibrium. 
Meanwhile, the expansion of industrial scale has failed to 
strengthen the competitiveness of photovoltaic industry. 
Therefore, the production subsidy policy is doomed to 
fail for the Chinese government in the long terms and will 
waste financial resources continuously.
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Finally, the Chinese government’s export-oriented 
production subsidy resulted in the quick expansion 
and lower prices of the Chinese photovoltaic products 
exported to American market. Susumu, Hajime and 
Kala established the import surge model and conducted 
a quantitative test. The results showed that the well-
organized industry could effectively appeal to the 
government for the trade restriction measures towards the 
countries having export surge (Hajime & Kala, 2006). 
The U.S. government was supporting the domestic new 
energy industry, thus it was very likely to conduct trade 
restriction measures in the background of widening 
trade deficit. Currently, the trade remedies, such as anti-
dumping, anti-subsidy policies had become the most 
severe trade restrictions that China suffered from the 
developed countries. The prerequisites of the “double-anti” 
policies were the essential damage of the U.S. industry, 
and the amount and the market share of import product 
surge in a short investigation period was the main judging 
criteria. Once China was imposed on high tariff because 
of antidumping and countervailing measures, exporters 
would suffer from severe trade restriction effect and 
lost the American market. Moreover, the “double-anti” 
policies will generate obvious demonstration effect, which 
will draw other markets’ attention. 
4.  THE U.S.’S INDUSTRY AND TRADE 
POLICY COMBINATION3
With the expansion of Chinese photovoltaic products 
in American market,  the American industry and 
political circles have claimed to take antidumping and 
countervailing measures since 2010. They blamed 
the competition of the Chinese industry for American 
declining photovoltaic industry and claimed that the 
 
3 Congressional files from 59 congressmen to president Obama on 
November 2 2011.
preferential policies that the Chinese government 
offered to its photovoltaic industry, including low-
interest loan, low-price land, tax exemption and export 
credit, had helped the Chinese enterprise earn 28% extra 
price competitiveness. They believed that extra price 
competitiveness of the Chinese enterprises had made 
the quick expansion of Chinese photovoltaic products in 
American market, and China’s exporters had grasped the 
benefit of U.S. government’s great quantity of consuming 
subsidy3. So the U.S has taken trade remedies twice 
against China. In Nov. 2011, the U.S. conducted the first 
anti-dumping and countervailing investigation against 
the Chinese crystalline silicon photovoltaic batteries 
and the components. The case got its final affirmative 
determination in Dec. 2012. After that, the increase rate of 
Chinese photovoltaic cells exported to the U.S. declined 
sharply and even became negative. In June 2013, the 
export amount was less than 50% of that in the June 2012. 
Since July 2013, the Chinese enterprise started to set up 
factories in Taiwan and packed the cells from mainland 
to export to the U.S., which increased the Chinese export 
again. Therefore, in Jan. 2014, the U.S. government 
launched the second trade remedy investigation against 
the Chinese photovoltaic products, which include Taiwan 
in the investigation scale. The case got its final affirmative 
determination in Jan. 2015. According to the tariff theory, 
the tariff increase will lead the market distortion and 
may cause welfare loss. Some researchers have applied 
the mathematical models and quantitative methods to 
conclude that the U.S. trade remedies measures protected 
the domestic photovoltaic industry in a certain extent at 
the sacrifice of huge consumers’ interest and the social 
total welfare (Hong & Huang, 2014; Zhan & Xiang, 
2014). So, the antidumping and countervailing measures 
reflected the U.S. government’s strategies about its 
industrial development. See Figure 2.
Figure 2
The Monthly Variation of Chinese Photovoltaic Export to the U.S. 
Note. Adapted from UN Comtrade (the world’s trade database, http://comtrade.un.org/)
From above analysis, the U.S. government’ subsidies 
for its photovoltaic industry and the trade remedy 
measures against China were combined to promote and 
protect the industry strategically. Rational subsidies were 
central measures, on one hand, the consuming subsidy 
was taken to enlarge the domestic market scale, which 
would stimulate the domestic manufacturers to expand 
HUANG Shi (2015). 
International Business and Management, 11(1), 32-40
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their production scale and reduce the cost; on the other 
hand, helping the strategic industry enterprises to solve 
the problem that R&D investment is capital demanding, 
highly risky, of positive external effects through 
technology spillovers, the R&D subsidy encouraged 
the manufacturers to strengthen their technological 
innovation and core competitiveness. According to WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(SCM Agreement), the consuming subsidy that were non-
specific and the R&D subsidy within a reasonable range 
belonged to the non-actionable subsidies, they would not 
damage the domestic exporters’ international markets 
by being imposed on countervailing measures. As for 
trade measures, when the domestic industry was strongly 
shocked by the foreign corresponding industries, trade 
remedies were executed to protect the domestic industry. 
This was because, on one hand, the market subsidy is non-
specific (which is different from buy-national policy) so 
that the foreign manufacturers were likely to occupy the 
domestic market and become the final beneficiaries. On 
the other hand, the R&D subsidy was unable to solve the 
problem of long pay off cycle so that the low-price foreign 
products probably occupied the domestic market quickly. 
The Table 4 reaches the strengths and weaknesses of the 
export-oriented production subsidy of Chinese government 
and the policies combination of U.S. government. 
Table 4
The Comparison of the Promotion Policies of Photovoltaic Industries in China and the U.S. 
Policies Strengths Weaknesses
China: Export-
oriented production 
subsidy
Production subsidy 
and export subsidy
(1) The effect of industrial 
promotion is direct and fast. 
(1) Actionable and prohibited 
subsidies is easy to cause trade conflicts; 
(2) Cause market distortion, low efficiency of utilizing 
resources and excess production capacity; 
(3) Cause the crowding-out effects against R&D 
enterprises and provoke the short-termism that industry 
expand production at low value-added industrial chain; 
(4) Export surge raise the risk of trade conflicts. 
The U.S.: The 
combination of the 
industrial subsidies 
and trade policies
R&D subsidy 
(1) Belongs to non-actionable 
subsidies in reasonable range: 
reducing the R&D cost for enterprise; 
(2) Promoting the enterprise 
technological innovation and 
industrial competitiveness 
(1) Unable to solve the problem of long pay off term and 
high risk for hi-tech R&D, so is hard to compete with 
low cost products in short terms. 
Market subsidy
(1) Belongs to non-actionable 
subsidies;
(2) Cultivate immature industry by 
increase market demands 
(1) Free-riders’ behaviors of the foreign exporters
The trade 
remedies: 
antidumping and 
countervailing 
measures
(1) The effects of R&D subsidy and 
market subsidy are protected by the 
trade restriction measures, which 
benefits the industry. 
(1) Consumers’ welfare loss;
(2) Trade warfare if inappropriately used; cannot promote 
industry competitiveness in long terms 
5.  CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
The export-oriented production subsidy can expand the 
industry scale, lower marginal cost and improve export 
in short terms. However, it has many defects. Firstly, 
encouraging the expansion of the production scale at 
low value-added industry chain but restricting the R&D 
investment, which go against the promotion of the core 
competitiveness and cause excess production capacity and 
low-price competition. Secondly, the soaring export is 
likely to stimulate the trade partners to take trade remedy 
measures. Thirdly, continuous financial subsidy cannot 
improve the overall social welfare and waste financial 
resources, for sake that in short run the consumers of 
import country will finally benefit from those production 
subsidy and in long run industry still lack competitiveness. 
On the contrary, the policy combination follows clear 
strategy. Consuming subsidy helps domestic industry to 
expand scale and lower cost, R&D subsidy provokes R&D 
investment to obtain competitiveness in long run, both the 
two subsidies are non-actionable according to WTO SCM 
Agreement. Moreover, antidumping and countervailing 
measures are taken to eliminate sudden shock from trade 
partners’ exports and guarantee the effectiveness of 
subsidies. Here we can get some useful policy suggestions 
for China to promote strategic emerging industries.
(1) China should change its industrial developing 
strategy. Clear and long-term goal shall be established 
to avoid the short-termism. Technology ability and core 
competitiveness of the strategic emerging industries 
should be emphasized instead of just earning profits by 
exporting to particular oversea markets. 
(2) China should exclude the prohibited subsides and 
enhance the application of the non-actionable subsides, 
especially the R&D subsidy and consuming subsidy. 
The latter one, which is non-actionable, increases the 
consumers’ interest and minimizes the market distortion. 
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The former one enhances the industrial technology and 
core competitiveness, but the targeted links and subsidy 
rate should be rationally determined according to the 
practical situations of the industry and market. 
(3) Trade remedy measures like countervailing and 
antidumping have been the mainstream of trade conflicts, 
and are tended to be exploited as ways to protect strategic 
emerging industries worldwide. China shall pay attention 
to countervailing and antidumping measures. On the one 
hand, take measures like diversifying export markets, 
cultivating domestic market, improving technology and 
eliminating pure low price competition to lower the 
chance being imposed on such measures; on the other, 
respond to investigations actively if is imposed. More 
importantly, China shall learn to utilize countervailing 
and antidumping measures to protect domestic industries 
from being shocked by soaring imports, then combined 
with R&D subsidy and consuming subsidy to promote the 
development of strategic emerging industries in the long run. 
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